Where is the
UK
Bound? (Part 2)
The Re-creation of
Europe
by
Terry Boardman
This article originally
appeared in New View magazine 1st
Quarter Winter 2007/2008
In
order to prepare for a discussion of where Britain might be 'bound' (heading
for) in the 21st century in the positive sense, the first part of
this article looked at where Britain is currently 'bound' (restricted) in the
negative sense of the word and concluded that it is bound by concepts of
politics (party tribalism) and economics (the 'free' market) rooted in the late
18th century a time when national polities, which were then at a
certain stage in their development, behaved
like self-centred individuals, adolescents in fact, and were led by elites whose
members often had grandiose images of themselves; one only needs to look at the
funerary monuments of the period to see this. It also concluded that Britain's
Prime Minister Gordon Brown and the current British political elite are 'bound'
by a view of British history that appears not to see that the imperial chapter
of British history that began with Henry VIII and his daughter Elizabeth I has
now closed in the reign of Elizabeth II and that the British people are now in a
position to take a different direction if they choose to do so. This part of the
article will consider what that different direction might be.
The Identity of the
UK
First is the question of the
existence and identity of the
UK
itself. Do the devolution arrangements introduced by
Tony
Blair's administration in 1997 spell the end of the
UK
as we know it, and is this something that should be welcomed or opposed? It has
often been pointed out that esoteric knowledge exists within the upper echelons
of the British elite that has enabled them to plan for the future and perpetuate
their control of British society. Like the Vatican, English
powerbrokers operate on long time frames: Rudolf Steiner indicated in
1916 that many of those with real power in Britain were from the same families
that had such power 400 years before.(1)
The transformation of the Empire into the Commonwealth, for example, was no
spontaneous act of generosity on the part of the former imperial masters as it
has often been portrayed. It was planned before the First World War and deliberately carried out in
accordance with foresight and knowledge of how resources would best be
controlled in the new century, namely, indirectly through economics and networks
of personal influence rather than by soldiers on the ground.(2)
Similarly, the English elite would have seen the rising wave of Celtic
nationalism which, stimulated by Ireland's independence in 1922, surfaced in the
1960s. As with
India, they have calculated how best to ride this wave and guide it in their own
interest; the answer was devolution a new kind of mini-'commonwealth' for
the
British Isles. But the Welsh Nationalist Party Plaid Cymru probably and the Scottish
Nationalist P certainly are bound to press for full independence from
England
eventually.
In a recent keynote foreign
policy speech (3)
Gordon
Brown
described
Britain
as "the first multinational state", and said that
Britain
has "always known that success
requires that people of different races, religions and backgrounds learn to live
in harmony with each other." However, this is to put a peculiar gloss on
British history. The way in which the constituent elements of the
UK
came together was not exactly a harmonious one; it was not a state whose
members, as
Brown
implies, and as the EU likes to say about itself, "voluntarily combined to
share peace and prosperity". Having conquered
England, the
Normans
(Northmen) - those Vikings with a
veneer of French civilisation - went
on to try to conquer the Celtic peoples of the
British Isles
, first
Ireland, then
Wales
and
Scotland. They then turned on
France
in the Hundred Years' War. Repulsed by a French national resurgence under Joan
of Arc, this aggressive Viking-Norman ruling class, who now belatedly called
themselves 'English', having after
400 years finally deigned to speak the language of their subjects, were forced
to restrict their energies to the British Isles. English control of
Ireland
was tightened, and in the whole period of British history from 1066 until the
present, a very short period of 49 years (4)
was the only time when the rulers of
England
appeared to be not intent on conquests beyond the
British Isles. Only then was
England
a purely insular state. To maintain their own, now Protestant, ascendancy and
fend off any resurgent Catholic challenge, the ruling groups then invited first
the King of Scotland James VI to be the King of England (1603) and 85 years
later, they invited the King of the
Netherlands
to invade
England
(1688); he became
William
III.
In both cases, the monarchs were effectively controlled by the native English
aristocracy. Neither the majority of the peoples of
Scotland
nor
Holland
were consulted on
England's unions with their nations; it was the rich merchants of
Edinburgh
and
Amsterdam
whose interests were best served by these unions. It could be argued, however,
that both unions were necessary for
England
to carry out its imperial project the creation of the
British Empire,(5) for it was after the unions with
Holland
in 1688 and
Scotland
in 1707, that the Empire took off. In that process, the City of
London
drew from the Dutch the vital skills of their financial acumen, while the Scots
especially played a key role in the military, in trade and in administration,
not to mention science, education and philosophy.
The
Irish were certainly never happy about being part of "the world's first
multi-national state"; the
UK
was created in 1801 as yet another means to keep them under control, and after
800 years of oppression by the English, they not unsurprisingly got out as soon
as they had a real chance (1922). Since the 1960s, the Celtic peoples as a whole
have shown an increasing restiveness with being part of the
Union
and a desire to return to their former status as independent peoples within the
European community of nations. Some English people and indeed some Celts too
think this a reversion to tribalism, a retrogressive nationalism that goes
against the cosmopolitan spirit of the age. But that would be to regard all
peoples, lands
Commemoration
of
Wolfe
Tone
's United Irishmen 1798
and histories as the same.
Scotland
is not
Slovakia
nor Cymru Croatia. Each people's individual story needs to be
looked at and understood on its
own terms rather than covered with a common label. (6) The Celtic peoples of the British Isles were forced into union
with England by English ruling groups, and with hindsight admittedly an all
too convenient capacity one can now see how 'the British' then
'collaborated' to create the world-spanning 'British' Empire (which the English
ruling class often tended to refer to as 'England', or the 'Empire of England')
with all its momentous consequences.
Today, however, barring a few
scattered islands here and there, the
British Empire
is no more, and the Celtic peoples understandably wish to control their own
affairs within a new European arrangement. Before the Viking conquests
(1013-16) by Sweyn and Canute and the Viking-Norman conquest by Duke
William of Normandy in 1066, Anglo-saxon England had been a respected,
prosperous, and cultured state within the community of Christendom; it minded
its own business and invaded no foreign lands rather like the descendants of
the Scandinavian Vikings today in fact. Yet in our time those Scandinavians
manage not only to make a signal cultural and social contribution to Europe;
they are also well-integrated into the international community through their
trade, their liberal immigration policies and their penchant for progressive
social forms to which many throughout the world look for inspiration. Would the
English be content with a similar constructive role in
Europe
?
England
needs to recognise the historical moment and wish the Celtic peoples well on
their return to autonomy within
Europe. The peoples of the British Isles will remain close in various ways, as indeed
England and Ireland have done since 1922, for they share not only the gifts of
nature, the geographical attributes of peoples living in Europe's largest
islands but also the shared heritage of the past, which has bound many of them
with ties of marriage, relationship and karma. Like
Iberia, (7)
Scandinavia
and the Balkans, the
British Isles
will surely remain a region with its own identity within the greater community
of
Europe.
Nature in the
British Isles
What does living in these
north-western islands of
Europe
give to the peoples who inhabit them? Is it not a sense for the elemental
forces of life that comes with the ocean-gifted mobility of our ever-changing
weather? The element in the
British Isles
that is perhaps the weakest is that of fire, but the watery, airy and earthy
mineral elements are there in abundance. It is therefore to be expected that
environmentalism will be well rooted here, and that is perhaps only right, given
the global pollution of Nature that originated with the Industrial Revolution
which spread from these islands. Is not this balanced elemental mobility
something which plays into the character of the English, Scots, Irish and Welsh in
their different ways and can we not expect that it will contribute to
the modern European mix in
a
mercurial manner, requiring only a further balancing by the fire of the
Mediterranean? There is an ancient, steady, bearing quality that pervades these
islands, for which the most suitable expression might well be the word 'mother'.
Even though the wilds of the Scottish Cairngorms, of Ireland's Connacht and the
Welsh Cambrians seem far removed from the gentle South Downs and the Vale of
Avalon, nevertheless the word 'mother' unites them both, for the wild starkness
of those northwest fastnesses
reminds us of the timeless, strong faithfulness of our motherland who has borne
us through millennia; these give us an inner strength, a gratitude and a grit,
while the southern English rolling and swelling hills and downs embrace us with
the mother's love and bounty; they warm and gladden our hearts. These special
upbearing and enfolding qualities of Mother Earth in the British Isles, and the
human history, from Stonehenge to William Wordsworth's Dove Cottage (8),
that has been forged by and within them, are surely what draws so many
travellers from the Continent and beyond, despite the unpredictable weather.
In addition to the common sense
and the sensitivity to Nature that are rooted in the environment of the
British Isles
, is there not also a fierce quality of independence gifted by this sense of
place? A quality which stems from the feeling that this land is a kosmos,
a world entire and thus so am I, for its spirit lives in me as I live in it? The
inhabitant of these islands cannot be like the Russian, the Indian, the Arab or
the Mongol, who has to find himself within the infinite expanse of the horizon
that threatens to overwhelm his sense of self. Nature in the
British Isles
is like the arms of the mother, binding, protecting, bestowing well-being,
boundaries and a sense of security. With this comes a tendency towards
self-confidence, innate balance and moderation. Are these not qualities that
would benefit a larger community?
Britain
and
Europe
The
next question then is: can this larger community be
Europe
? And if so, what kind of
Europe
? Many of those who cling to the chapter of British history that is now closing,
the imperial saga, wish
Britain
to withdraw from the EU and to be itself alone, a proud island nation in
communion through trade with the whole world. Often, however, those same people
wish
Britain
to remain in very special relationship with the other parts of the world who
speak English, namely, the white dominions of the Commonwealth and especially
with the
USA, the offspring that has assumed its parent's imperial mantle. They want Britain
to maintain the 'special relationship' with the USA, which means continuing
dependence on the USA for nuclear weapons provision and technology-based
intelligence, while remaining also the world's no.2 in arms manufacture (in real
terms). This is essentially a chauvinist vision, national or even racial, that
will only exacerbate the kind of problems
Britain
is already faced with, as ultimately, it is a position based on old
Palmerstonian concepts (9) of
national self-interest and realpolitik.
The
nub of the issue here is whether the people of Britain wish to continue, guided
by their own political class, with a role that can be described as actually or
vicariously 'imperial', in the sense of seeking to ensure that the lifestyle and
values of the English-speaking peoples are somehow imposed on the rest of the
world, whether by military or economic means. The people of the USA will have
another chance in the presidential election year 2008 to decide their own
response to this question, but it seems unlikely, judging from the foreign
policy statements of the leading presidential contenders, that the American
political class is about to alter
its foreign policy in any significant way. The American people are thus going to
need all the help they can get to cope with the results of the actions of their
own politicians. How would the British be best placed to be of assistance to the
American people as distinct from the American political
elites? I
would suggest they can best do this by helping to create a different kind of
European community from the one that is currently under construction.
Let us put the great 'Britain
and
Europe
question' fully in context here. It would seem that we may be faced in the 21st
century by yet another false dichotomy comparable to the capitalism-or-communism
bipolarity of the 20th century. It goes something like this: should
we seek to realise a world state ruled by a world government as soon as
possible, driven by the conviction that only this can save us from the unholy
trinity of ecological and economic disaster, natural catastrophe scares
(asteroid collision, pandemics etc), and an
alleged World War IV (the so-called War on Terror, or the so-called War against
Islamofascism) OR: should we ignore these as artificially created illusions and
return to some arcadian notion of the national sovereignty past located
somewhere in the early 1700s before grand empires became the norm? This is a
rather extreme version of the polarity perhaps. It is represented in the USA for
example, by, on the one hand, those in the multinational corporate business
world, who are no longer concerned about mere 'nations', and on the other, by
those of the 'red-neck' patriot community, who wish to return to what they see
as the self-reliant spirit of 1776 and Thomas Jefferson. In Britain there
are heard the siren voices of those
former British politicians who have given enthusiastic service in the
EU burueaucracy, men such as Neil Kinnock, Leon Brittan and Peter Mandelson,
who say "a plague on both these houses; the sensible middle way between
global governance and autarkic old-fashioned nation states is that represented
by the European Union!" It seems to this writer that, as is often the case,
all of these views are correct to a degree, though not in the sense any of them
intended.
In
the very long run, there is indeed likely to be 'some form' of world 'state'. Through
changes in human consciousness and technological progress, humanity has clearly
been moving in this direction towards ever larger polities since kingdoms and
nation states emerged from tribal alliances. To deny this would be foolish.
Equally foolish would be to artificially accelerate political development as the
Bolsheviks did when they sought the premature
realisation of communism; foolish also to seek to accelerate matters by
deception and stealth, as western elites have been doing with the development of
the EU since at least 1950.(10) They have seen the EU as the first stone laid in the
architecture of their eventual world state, to be followed by similar stages on
the path to that goal: continental blocks such as the North American Union, the
African Union, the Eurasian Union and the Asia-Pacific Union. As with Napoleon's
and Hitler's grand designs, all such schemes will only end in disaster as they
seek to force people into accepting New World Orders that they are not prepared
to accept because they go against the proper and gradual evolution of the
individual human spirit. All such grand designs imposed from on high by
theatrical dictators or shadowy elites are a denial of the choices that can be
made by individual human beings by forcing development in a certain direction.
They are an arrogant assumption of the all-too-ancient belief that one man or a
few has the right and the power to shepherd the many.
Neither
would it be desirable for a world state to be formed on the model of a national
state with a world government, a world parliament, a world police force, world
army or a world central bank etc. That was the dream of some in the Anglo-american elite in the first
decades of the 20th century. For the philosophical underpinnings of
such a state polity are those which would correspond to the level of development
of western humanity in the late 18th century, which was often all too
self-centred, yet by the time a 'world state' is at all possible in future
centuries, humanity will have moved on and be in a different cultural and
spiritual place. The world state of the distant future can be one based not on
the immature egoism of adolescents but on the mature mutual respect of adults.
It can be organised not like a pyramid with orders proceeding downwards from
those who speak a particular language but like a round table, at which
conversation and resulting resolutions proceed on an entirely different and more
socially considerate basis than is possible today. (11) The world state need not be a top-down hive like today's UN
that is dominated by the self-appointed oligarchy of the Security Council. It
can be an association of continental, regional and national communities
that organises itself in a threefold manner -
in three autonomous but interrelating spheres of culture, politics and economics
- foreshadowed in the various threefold social archetypes known since
ancient times. (12)
The
urge towards a united humanity, which the
British Empire
also crudely foreshadowed, the urge which has been present within the
unconscious will of humanity since approximately the 1870s (13) will indeed one day be realised but it must not be achieved in
the devious manner in which western oligarchies, seeing themselves as the
shepherds of humanity, are now devising. If one reads carefully between the
lines of
Gordon
Brown's first foreign policy speech as
Prime Minister
(14)
then this agenda seeps through only too clearly, despite the often-heard view that
Brown's
"vision" for foreign policy remains even more opaque than his domestic
vision. (15)
Substituting Gordon Brown for Lord Rosebery, we can refer to Rudolf Steiner's
words about Rosebery in 1916 "It
is important that a pretension of this kind should ring forth, not from a people
but from an individual who is backed by various concealed groups, a pretension
that the whole world must be stamped with the mark of the English spirit".(16)
The
ultimate striving for a global governance stamped with the mark of the Anglo-american
spirit" seems to breathe through Gordon Brown's entire speech. Some form of
'world state' is indeed very likely to come about eventually, but that time is
not yet; the reality is rightly very far off, and the present drive towards it
is but a continuation of the last chapters of imperialism and dictatorship.
The
polar option of a return to the kind of independent nation states of the early
19th century which jealously and selfishly guard and exercise their
national self-interest in Palmerstonian fashion must also be ruled out in our
times because that corresponds to a stage of political, social and cultural
evolution from which we have moved on. Pride, chauvinism, the urge to compete
and dominate, suspicion of others, and a moated mentality these can no
longer be the stuff of international relations. Such a paradigm led inexorably
to the catastrophe of the Great War.
What
then of the representatives of the current EU elite, Messrs Kinnock, Brittan,
Mandelson, Giscard d'Estaing, Barroso et
al., who see themselves and their project as the
harbingers of a new form of peaceful polity in world affairs the would-be
transformers of French and German swords into European ploughshares?
Are they the true middle way between the Scylla of Palmerston and the
Charybdis of
Rockefeller
?
Alas no, for the EU combines at least two souls within its breast:
on the one hand, there are the ancient theocratic and
hierarchical spectres of
Rome
and
Egypt
in the efforts of those who are
seeking to revive the ancient glories of the Holy Roman (and very Catholic)
Empire.
And
on the other hand, there
is the drive, led from within the
English-speaking countries, towards a premature world state, which would
mean a
Europe
fully subordinated to materialist goals. These two options for
Europe
are but a reflection of the larger and older East-West polarity of collectivism
in the East and individualism in the West. The Holy Roman theocratic impulse of
the pre-Reformation epoch that carries within it the spiritual spectres of both
Egypt
and
Rome
emphasises a particular kind of community,
led by an oligarchy (e.g. the European Commission) that is more overtly 'kingly'
and aristocratic in character, if not in actual breeding, and which wraps itself
with a patina of cultural and historical pride and glory. It is opposed by the
Anglo-American economic managerial impulse of the present that also bears within
it, though less visibly, the spiritual spectres of Egypt and Rome through its connections
to the old
Freemasonry of
Britain and America - the consciousness of those in Blair
and Straw sign the European Constitution, Rome 2004
the
Anglo-American elite who
see themselves as the
imperial Romans of today, bringing civilisation to the peoples of the world.
This stream actually
emphasises the atomistic selfishness of the desire-driven individual as economic
agent, yet it too is guided by a less visible but arguably more effective
sheepherding oligarchy
one of financial wizards.
Given
this polarity of forces striving for domination in Europe, should Britain - which,
as I argued in Part 1 of this article, has now actually no further need to bind
itself to the USA, since its imperial role is over - be
'bound for' Europe at all? My answer
is yes but neither for the
Europe
of the EU nor for the EU as a trojan horse for the
USA.
In this sense, the strong independent-mindedness of the redneck patriots
referred to earlier comes into its own in that what is needed is for Britons to
refuse to be pushed down roads where continental or transatlantic oligarchs
would lead them, and instead, develop a different vision of
Britain's
role in
Europe
and
Europe's
place in the world.
Queen
Elizabeth
II
and US
Vice President
Richard
Cheney
Britain
is geographically part of
Europe,
despite loose talk of a transatlantic 'pond'. The peoples of the
British
Isles
are overwhelmingly, post-1945
immigration from the former Empire notwithstanding, genetically Europeans.
British history and culture were until the 16th century intimately
related to, indeed emerged from, that of European
Christendom. For at least the first 1500 years of the Christian era then, and
indeed, back to the time of
Stonehenge
and beyond,
Britain
was part of
Europe.
This simple fact often tends to be forgotten. Only for the last 500 years, the
period of the imperial chapter, has
Britain
looked elsewhere than
Europe
for its destiny, and even during that time
Britain
always kept an eye on
Europe
as it looked outward over the oceans. What the British met across the oceans
after all, were not just peoples previously unknown to them, but also, as the
centuries of empire went by, more familiar ones from the European homeland:
Spanish, Portuguese, Dutch, French, Russian, Danish, Belgian, and German traders
and colonialists, and Britain's ruling groups were forever concerned that a new
power would arise on the
Continent to challenge the British maritime hegemony; hence the recourse to the
stratagem of the balance of power. Now that the imperial chapter has closed, is
it not time for the post-imperial prodigal to 'come home'? Since 1950,
Europe
has been in the process of becoming a different kind of community. This was
inevitable after the catastrophe of the second Thirty Years' War 1914-45 and the
end of European and then Soviet colonialism; indeed, some prescient voices were
already calling for some kind of united
Europe
back in the 19th century. One can even recall the visions of
Kant
and Schiller. (17) The problem is:
what kind of
Europe
is it to be? One merely of the past in a new dress, as intended by the EU
architects Monnet, Schumann, Delors and others, would-be shepherds of sheep, or
one truly of the present? And can the peoples of the
British
Isles
make a contribution to this
'reformation' of their own continent?
They
can surely only do so if they first abjure Gordon Brown's implied assertion
about Anglo-American 'shared values' - that the USA is but Britain writ large,
and if they abandon their deep-rooted nostalgia for the top-dog position that
came with the lost Empire, a position that many still wish to experience
vicariously through 'the special relationship'. There is not only oneself as
individual and member of the human race; there is also the third middling
element of one's membership of a community, a nation, a continent, a specific
'team', and teams do not always have to be sportive and competitive; there are
also 'work teams' that exist to carry out certain goals. Nationality can also be
seen in this sense: I work within this national team, which I have opted to
join, in order to learn things from it and help it to achieve certain goals
peculiar to it. As we are beginning to realise the truth
Steiner
spoke out 90 years ago, that the Earth is a living being,(18) so we can also realise that there is a sense in which
Europe,
Africa,
America,
Asia,
Australasia
also have their identities as living beings. The Earth is not a
playground for Britons as 'superior folk' have regarded it since Victorian
times. They have a responsibility for attending to their own part of the Earth:
their 'homeland',
Britain,
and their neighbourhood,
Europe
.
Secondly,
Britons can positively embrace the challenge of helping to form a new kind of
Europe that serves not the Papacy's nostalgia for the Middle Ages, nor a French
nostalgia for the vicarious re-experiencing of the glory days of Louis XIV and
Napoleon, nor a German nostalgia for the Holy Roman Empire of Charles V nor an
American goal of using Europe in a new bipolar struggle with 'the East' (Russia,
China). In doing this, they will need to realise that Europe is not and never
has been a twofold East-West polar entity as it appeared to become in the mid-20th
century but has in fact always been -
geographically, politically, and culturally a threefold community: more
collective in the east and more individual in the west, even into the contours
of borders and coastlines certainly, but between east and west, there has always
been the mercurial middle region of central Europe, from Sweden and Denmark in
the north, through the German, Czech, Slovak, Swiss, Austrian, Hungarian, and
Slovene lands in the centre, down
through Italy to Sicily in the south. This was largely the territory of the old
Holy Roman Empire
so much contested by Emperors, Popes, Kings of France and Ottoman Sultans. The
middle region, where East and West mingle and merge to create a third element,
was located between the political and geographical particularities of the west
and the more amorphous vastnesses of the east. This threefoldness of
Europe
,
matched by the traditional threefoldness of
Europe's
Christian confessions - Protestant,
Catholic and Orthodox - and by that
of its three basic linguistic groupings
- Germanic, Slavic, Romance
constitutes the fundamental threefold nature of
Europe
in geography, politics and culture.
Without reckoning with this, Europeans can
build for no sound future. No one strong nation can sit in the 'driving seat' of
Europe
,
as
John
Major
and
Tony
Blair
boasted
Britain
must do, and impose its ways on the rest. This European threefoldness not only
reflects the threefold archetype of the human being (body, soul, spirit)(19)
but it enables Europe to be a mediator between the larger global polarity of
Asia and America, China and the USA, relations between which will surely assume
ever greater significance in the coming decades. For if Europe does not make use
of its deep-rooted cultural threefoldness more individual in the West, more
collective in the East and a balance in the middle then there will be no
effective 'middle' that can bridge between the radical individualism that is all
too common in the USA and the radical collectivism that is still all too
prevalent in Asia.(20) The two
socio-cultural poles of the world will continue to disagree, dispute and
communicate ineffectively as they have been doing since the much-trumpeted 'End
of Communism' in 1989 and the replacement of the 'Communist threat' with the
'Islamist threat' and the 'Chinese threat'. For Europeans to be truly of service
to their fellow human beings in
America
and
Asia
,
they need to be able to function as an effective bridge. To do that, they must
recast their own continent's culture not on the basis of past dreams but on the
basis of its deepest realities: its geography, genetics, language groups,
historical and cultural experience for good and ill, and its present challenges.
Europe
must avoid both being pulled in two, as it was in 1945, and being drawn entirely
into one camp, as is threatening to become the case in our time. Having done so
much, out of the resources of their 'insular point', their island mentality, to
construct a consciousness of one world, the 'global periphery', so to speak, is
it not now a worthy task for the British peoples to bring their unique
capacities to assist in the reformation of their neighbourhood, their continent,
together with their fellow Europeans, so that the continent which once caused so
much pain to the peoples of the world can in future times become a central place
of mediation for the world?
The Bound for
Britain
Finally, there is the question of the 'bound' or leap that
Britain
can make into this new European future. I would suggest that it is to raise
consciousness of the nature of the
Europe
that could be born on the basis of
Europe's
threefold reality. The British can give a clear and dramatic signal to their
fellow Europeans that they will no longer continue the one-way representation of
American business ideas, corporate interests and military strategy into
Europe
but will also more actively strive to represent
Europe
to the
USA.
This would require a firm statement of intent from
Britain's
political leadership following pressure from the populace a declaration of
independent resolution. During the Great War,
Rudolf
Steiner
repeatedly pointed out that Imperial Germany had no constructive and uplifting
values, beyond fighting for survival, with which to counter the 14 Points of
American
President
Woodrow
Wilson.
No European solution to the crisis of
Europe
was on offer from the governments of Middle Europe. This was why he brought
forth the concepts of the Threefold Social Commonwealth.(21) At present, Britain too is utterly bereft of any vision; the
country is drifting, increasingly uneasy, especially since 911 and the Iraq War,
about entanglements with the regime of George Bush. Many
in
Britain's
political parties may not care that
Britain
is seen as too timidly following
US
foreign policy, but a growing number of the British people resent that role.
Many Britons are suspicious of the creeping powers of the EU but are too
disinterested in it as an issue, feeling it to be too mundane, too dull and
undramatic. In addition to divesting themselves of the image that they are but
an American trojan horse, the
British will need to do all they can to awaken themselves and their
fellow-Europeans to the truth of
what has been behind the European Project since 1950. Europeans can then come to
understand that a new European community
(surely a better name than Union) is to be formed not on the basis of
home-grown, European spectres from the past nor by means of non-European
manipulations in the present: a Europe dominated not by the dictates of Rome,
Brussels, Frankfurt, London, Washington or Wall St; a Europe in which the
spiritual life, the political life and the economic life each has its own
rightful sphere that relates to but does not invade the others as is currently
the case. Not a European Union, a
centralist United States of Europe that emphasises the Oneness of Constantine, Justinian,
Charles V, Philip II, Louis XIV, Napoleon, Hitler and Stalin, but rather a
European Community that respects the associative three-in-oneness
of European cultural, political and economic life: the creation and development
of a totally new form of political association of peoples. For the British, with
their history of defiance of dictatorship, their love of innovation, their
individual eccentricity and respect for the peculiar and particular, and their
feeling for team spirit, to bring their own unique capacities to a collaborative
re-creation of this new Europe would surely be a tough but worthy challenge and
a profound contribution to the peace of the world.
NOTES
(1) See R.Steiner The
Karma of Untruthfulness, Vol. 1 lecs. of
16 & 17 December 1916. An examination for example, of the pedigrees of
David
Cameron
and other leading Tories such as
Sir
Michael
Ancram
and
Lord
Cranbourne
is instructive. For an example of the long-range
thinking of the English elite, see Balfour's 1909 letter to Theodor Roosevelt in
K.Young, Arthur
James Balfour London,
(G. Bell and Sons, 1963); also, J.E.Kendle,
The
Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Univ.
of Toronto Press, 1974)
(2) This was
done by the Round Table Group, founded in 1909 and led by
Lord
Milner
and his acolytes
Lionel
Curtis,
Philip
Kerr
and others. See
C.Quigley, The Anglo-American Establishment (Books in Focus, 1981); J.E.Kendle, The
Round Table Movement and Imperial Union (Univ.
of Toronto Press, 1974) especially ch. 8; and J.M.Butler,
Lord
Lothian
(Philip
Kerr)
1882-1940 (
Macmillan, 1960): "Indians [Kerr noted in 1912] were
becoming interested in politics. The country 'must for all time remain within
the Empire', with Dominion status as the goal; but we must retain
India
by winning her respect and not by force."
(p.175)
(3) Mansion
House
12 Nov 2007
. Full text:
http://www.number10.gov.uk/output/page13735.asp
(4)
1558-1607 - the entire reign of
Elizabeth
I plus 4 years. The last English
possession in
France - Calais - was lost in 1558.
(5)
A goal imagined by Elizabethan
occultist
John
Dee,
King
James
I and
Oliver
Cromwell.
(6)
The Czechs and Slovaks were
artificially yoked together in 1919, so it is hardly surprising that they should
have wanted a 'velvet divorce' in 1993. The peoples of the Balkans with the
exception of the Serbs had not been independent nations for almost a thousand
years; hardly surprising then that they too should have difficulties with each
other once the yokes of their common masters (Ottomans,
Habsburgs, Communists) were removed. It would certainly be
naive in the extreme for Britons to say: "why can't these Balkan people
just live together as we have done in
Britain?"
(7)
It is likely that
Catalonia
and the Basque regions of
Spain
will become ever more autonomous if not
completely independent.
(8)
Lake District
home of the poet
William
Wordsworth
(9)
Henry Temple, Lord Palmerston (1784-1865), Tory Secretary at War 1809-1828, Whig
Foreign Secretary 1830-1834, 1835-1841, and 1846-1851, Prime Minister
1855-1858, 1859-1865. Known as Pam, and less affectionately, as Lord Pumice
Stone for his abrasive 'gunboat diplomacy', he famously remarked: "Nations
have no permanent friends or allies, they only have permanent interests.
(10) e.g.
Jean
Monnet's extremely devious formation of the European
Coal and Steel Community. See, C. Booker & R.North, The
Great Deception Can the European Union Survive? (Continuum, 2003), J.
Laughland, The Tainted Source The
Undemocratic Origins of the European Idea (Warner Books, 1997), F. Duchene, Jean
Monnet First Statesman of Interdependence (Norton, 1994).
(11) The House of Commons in the
so-called 'mother of parliaments' frequently
resembles a snarling and howling bear pit, and an anachronistically bewigged Mr
Speaker is required to enforce order on the often juvenile behaviour of the
elected representatives.
(12)
For example the trio of Greek goddesses Hera
(might), Athene (wisdom), and Aphrodite (beauty) between whom Paris had to
choose; the 3 Kings of the New Testament with their three gifts gold (wisdom)
frankincense (feeling/devotion) and myrrh (purification of the body); the
threefold motto misapplied by the French revolution liberty (cultural life),
equality (civic life), and fraternity (economic life).
(13)
Since at least the 15th
century (Trithemius of Sponheim) esotericists have known that the year 1879
would see the beginning of the Age of the
Archangel
Michael
which, like the previous Age of Michael c.600 BC
to 150 BC, would be marked by cosmopolitanism and a focus on the mental and
spiritual aspects of culture.
(14)
see n.3 above
(15)
Jackie
Ashley in The
Guardian,
http://www.guardian.co.uk/commentisfree/story/0,,2209482,00.html
(16) R.Steiner, The Karma of Untruthfulness, Vol. 1 lec. of
11 Dec. 1916
.
(17)
Immanuel
Kant,
Philosophical
Project for Perpetual Peace, 1795; and Novalis, Christendom
or
Europe
?,
1799 (publ. 1826)
(18) E.g.
Lectures in Dόsseldorf in 1909,
Berlin
in 1911, published as
The
Spiritual Hierarchies and the Physical World, Reality and Illusion
(19)
Asia, with its Islamic, Indic and Sinic regions, and America, with its
more Europe-oriented East Coast, its more Pacific-focused West Coast, and
the central Mid-West region can also be said to be in their way threefold.
(20) It goes without saying that the
USA
is not only individualistic; community life is strong in many
places there too; nevertheless, it surely remains true that American values on
the whole affirm the person rather than the community. Likewise with
Asia, where there are also many striving individuals
within the overall collective tendency of the society, and yet, the dominant
values are those of the community and the collective rather than those of the
person.
(21) R.Steiner, Towards Social Renewal (Rudolf Steiner Press, 1999)
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